Party left-right positions figure prominently in theories and analyses of democratic decision making.
The policy meaning of elections and of the policy representation that follows requires that parties communicate along an identifiable single dimension, such as left-right, so that voters and other decision makers can know the meaning of the policy bundles parties embody. Our aim here is to investigate the possibilities and limitations when using left-right party position scores from expert surveys and Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to compare party locations across time and across nations. Limitations, either cross-temporal or cross-national, leave gaps in one's ability to investigate how parties operate to fulfill a promise of democracy-to enable popular control over public policy.
For instance, a measurement record of static party positions when in fact party position taking is dynamic, if it is, would make it impossible to investigate whether parties try to accommodate the position of the median voter (Downs 1957; Adams 2001) , adapt their positions to one another or to their own past success (Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992; 1998) , follow through on their policy promises to voters while in government (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994) , or supply sufficiently dynamic offerings to electorates so as to make parties in parliament and government accurately reflect the position of median voters in the long run (McDonald, Paskeviciute, Best, and Cremona 2004) . Non-comparable measurements of left-right positions across nations render doubtful the results of analyses into whether left-and right-leaning governments in different nations adopt different policies (Lijphart 1999, 258-300; McDonald and Budge 2005) .
On the question of cross-time comparisons, what we know from the outset is that left-right positions as measured by expert surveys are mostly static but for a small amount of noise (McDonald and Mendes 2001, 100) . What is one to make of that? One possibility is that party left-right position taking is, in fact, more static than dynamic. And, even if they are more dynamic than static, which expert observers describe when asked (see, e.g., country-specific commentary in Müller and Strøm, eds., 2000) , it is possible that empirical analysts will have to be work with static measurements and limit their inquires to questions where party position dynamics do not matter, because expert survey measurements are the best we can do on the left-right dimension. To confront these two possibilities, we use the CMP record of party left-right positions over the post-War period to investigate whether it is plausible to infer there are systematically observable party dynamics along the left-right dimension.
On the question of cross-national comparisons, there is no doubt that expert surveys and the CMP were designed to capture these. Peter Mair and Frank Castles put the point directly when they reflected on what motivated them to carryout their survey.
What was needed, … , was a more systematic data base, in which variations across a common cross-national scale could be compared, and in which real differences between parties could be measured (Mair and Castles 1997, 151) .
Whether Castles and Mair, others who pursued their expert survey approach, and still others who worked on the CMP succeeded in identified cross-nationally comparable party positions stands today more as an article of faith than as an intensively investigated and demonstrable fact. Here we investigate the success each has had in measuring left-right positions in ways that permit meaningful cross-national comparisons.
The analysis begins with a consideration of why one should care about left-right positioning and how its meaning is captured by the expert surveys of Castles and Mair (1984) , Laver and Hunt (1992) , and Huber and Inglehart (1995) , on the one hand, and by the CMP, on the other. Our results show that expert surveys and the CMP can be used to characterize left-right party positions in similar ways and that party positions in several but not all policy domains are associated with left-right. With that as the backdrop, our second analysis proceeds to ask whether there are dynamics in the left-right party positions worth recording and taking into account. While expert surveys measure the long-run general tendencies of party left-right positions, our analysis of the CMP shows there are systematic dynamics to party left-right positions. Our third and final analysis asks whether it is plausible to think expert surveys and the CMP capture important differences across nations. These results show that expert surveys do not carry us much beyond what could be achieved by scoring party left-right positions according to each one's party-family affiliation. The CMP, on the other hand, records meaningful differences across nations.
Left-Right Party Positions
Left-right is the core currency of political exchange in Western democracies (Huber and Inglehart 1995) . As with price and quantity in economic exchange, it is ever-present in the thinking about politics for most scholars and commentators. That is not to credit left-right with importance because it so often figures prominently in political writing and conversation. To do so is a flimsy ad populum fallacy. The serious argument runs the other way around. Left-right, or some similar singledimension concept, is fundamentally important to empirical and normative democratic theory, and therefore theorists, analysts, and commentators frequent rely on it to explain and evaluate the operation of democracies.
An important lesson to be taken from a half-century of applying social choice theory to the study of democratic politics is this: if policy meaning can be gleaned from democratic decision making, a single dimension such as left-right is required. Collective decisions that invoke several dimensions threaten to negate the possibilities of elections having policy meaning (Dahl 1956, 124-31; Epstein 1964) and of a science of democratic politics (Riker 1980; Ordeshook 1980) . Thus, if democratic processes are capable of creating popular control of public policy and, for political scientists, if democratic processes are going to be the subject of systematic theorizing and testing, we must accept that some forms of institutional arrangements, parties among them, control dimensionality so as to induce equilibrium expectations (Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1982) .
Other dimensions will come to the fore from time to time, with the effect and sometimes the purpose of upsetting equilibrium expectations (Riker 1983; ), but to grasp their importance one has to start with an understanding of what otherwise would happen. That will usually come from a predominant dimension such as left-right. So even in the face of multi-dimensional maneuvering, left-right has a theoretical role to play.
What is meant when referring to policy preferences as left and right? In contemporary politics it refers most directly to the scope and breadth of what goods and services should and should not be public goods. Those who want the government to organize a nation's economy are on the left; those who want private enterprise to organize a national economy are on the right. Advocating public ownership of industries puts one far to the left, desires to have government closely regulate privately owned firms are not quite as far left. Government control over the means of production is only part of the economic aspect. Economic distribution issues, in terms of activities that we associate with the modern welfare state, also distinguish left from right. For example, is medical care a public good?
Persons and parties on the left versus right answer that question differently. It should be delivered to those who have earned enough to purchase it (right), to the elderly only (center-right), to those whose resources indicate they could not purchase it for themselves (center-left), to everyone (left). The same question could be asked about education, food, housing, clothing, etc. Being on the right means one sees little if any need for government involvement in the distribution of these goods and services; gradations of being on the left see some greater (more left) or lesser (less left) need for government involvement.
It would be wrong, however, to describe the left-right continuum entirely as a bundle of public good/economic issues that go together in predictable ways? That does not cover left-right in the 18 th and 19 th centuries and it does not even cover some of the meaning we have in mind today.
The term left-right was around in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the scope of public goods was so narrowly circumscribed that the economic policy issues that are so prevalent today played at most a small role in drawing a line of distinction between those on the left and those on the right. Furthermore, when talking about left-right in contemporary times, the notion of extreme-right parties is applied to nationalist parties with authoritarian prescriptions for social order. Whether an extreme-right party is neo-fascist in the sense that it advocates a large economic role for government, or free-marketeer in the sense of advocating little or no economic role for government, or largely silent on economic matters, extreme-right parties are easy to identify. [ Figure 1 about here] What contributes to the CMP distinctiveness? One possibility is that the CMP contains onesixth more noise than the expert measures. Another possibility is that the specific variance (in contrast to its common variance, to use factor analysis terminology) in CMP scores accounts for something real but which is not shared by the expert scoring.
What might be the sources of real (systematic) variation in CMP scores that is not commonly shared with the expert survey scores? The two possibilities we explore below are that the CMP leftright scores contain variation associated with a degree of dynamic party position taking that expert surveys mostly miss and a degree of cross-national differentiation that expert surveys also miss. That means that only about two-thirds of the systematic variance in these data is coming from differences in average party positions. The remaining one-third is noise, real movements in party positions, or some combination.
Party Positions and Their Dynamics

Party Left-Right Dynamics
We assess whether evidence of systematic change in party positioning exists by estimating an autoregressive equation on each party's series of positions. Three different patterns could result.
First, party positions that shift over the long run, such as those forming a trend, will result in an autoregressive equation that indicates a party's long-run expected value (a sort of dynamic mean) is different from its mean. 4 Second, a party that changes by drifting away from its mean position for a sustained period but later coming back to it, a characteristic of cyclical movements, will result in an autoregressive equation with patterned change that leaves the long-run expected value and the mean close to one another. Third, autoregressive results indicating that the mean is a reasonable description regardless of a party's position at the previous election (i.e., the slope could reasonably be inferred to be zero) are situations where parties are moving as-if randomly around their respective mean positions, neither trending nor drifting.
To describe in more detail how the autoregressive equation can be used to identify what we label in accordance with the three patterns, respectively, as (1) changers, (2) drifters, and (3) homeostatic wanderers, we start with the equation as applied to any one party's left-right position. It takes this form:
LR t is a party's left-right position for the current election; LR t-1 is that party's left-right position at the previous election; α is the intercept; β is the slope; and ε t is assumed to be a set of well behaved, homoscedastic and nonautocorrelated, errors in party positions at the current elections. When the estimated value of β is not distinguishable from zero, it indicates that the movements around the party left-right mean are, so far as we can tell, random deviations from which a party can be expected to return to its typical (mean) position at the next election. When β is distinguishable from zero and in the interval -1 to +1 (all of our estimates are in that interval), party movements show signs of sustained changes through time. For example, a statistically significant slope of .75 indicates that a deviation from the party's long-run typical left-right position is expected to move toward (but not to) that position at the next election. The speed at which it approaches that long-run typical position is (1 -β). In the case of the example, (1 -β) is 1 − .75, or .25; therefore that party is expected to move one-quarter of the way from where it was at the last election toward where it is expected to be in the long run.
The difference between where we can expect a party to be in the long run and where it is on average is one way to describe how and by how much a party has changed. To estimate where a party's left-right position will be in the long run, we divide the intercept by the value of one minus the slope-i.e., [α / (1 -β)] (see Spafford 1971; Price and Sanders 1993).
As we shall see, there are parties for which the slope is distinguishable from zero and the difference between the mean and the party's long-run expected position is large. These are the parties we label changers. There are also instances of parties with slopes distinguishable from zero but with small differences between its mean versus its long-run expected value. These are parties that drifted one way, then the other-going through cycles of reliably predictable and moderately sustained movements. We call these parties drifters. Finally, there are parties that diverge from and converge towards their mean values in an unpredictable manner. For these parties, movements away from their mean positions are expected to be short-lived, with an expectation of each one returning to its mean position at the next election. We call these parties homeostatic wanderers. [ Figure 2 about here]
The eight changers are listed in Table 1 . There, too, we provide a description of the pattern of change along with each party's mean value over the period, its so-called target position (which is where, based on our analysis, we expect the party left-right position to move to over the long run), and its left-right position by decade. The first thing to notice is that of the eight changers four no longer existed in the same organizational form in the late 1990s. Two Italian parties, the PSDI and PRI, each of which had been moving to the right, were themselves transformed when the party system as a whole changed after the 1992 election. In addition, two other changers are Dutch Christian parties-ARP and CHU-that combined, also with the Catholic KVP, to form the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) in the 1970s. The movements of both Dutch (Protestant) Christian parties show a trend leftward, and after they merged into the CDA they held a center-left position. That leaves four parties that have different left-right positions in the 1990s compared to positions they took in, say, 1960. Patterns of change for these four are consistent with what informed observers of these parties tell us was happening throughout the period. The Austrian FPÖ is reported to have placed itself to the left during the 1960s in order to gain favor with the SPÖ for government coalition bargaining purposes, then gave up that strategy and moved decidedly to the right (Müller 2000, 87) . Mair (1986) reports that Fine Gael took noticeable steps to the left during the 1960s and 1970s and stood clearly to the left of Fianna Fáil during that time. Hanne Marthe Narud and Kaare Strøm have said of the leftward drift of Norway's SP that "the party's opposition to European integration has gradually generalized into a greater skepticism towards market economies" (Narud and Strøm 2000, 164) .
Finally, the Democrats in the United States, most especially under the leadership of President Clinton but presaged by smaller movements toward the center during the 1980s, is generally understood to have moved to the center (see, e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) .
[ Table 1 about here]
Nineteen parties are classified as drifters, more than twice the number of changers. The drifters are listed in Table 2 . Recall that our classification criterion for drifters versus changers is that, while a drifter's position undergoes predictable and sustained changes, in the long run its leftright position is not expected to be much different from its mean position over the entire period. This is reflected in the column in the middle of the table, where the mean and (long-run) target values are reported. One general pattern of drift covers the Anglo-American parties. In Australia, New Zealand, UK, and U.S., the drifters each drifted rightward, a movement that also describes the U.S. Democrats in Table 1 . The reason many of these appear to be drifters rather than changers is that along the way their movements were erratic enough as not to provide a firm basis for describing them as trends.
Among the drifters in Belgium (if we were to add in the combined liberals of the 1950s and 1960s), the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, the movements follow a pattern where the 1960s and 1970s [ Table 2 about here]
The modal outcome is that of the homeostatic wanderers. There are 54 of them, 66.7% of all the parties analyzed. These are parties that, as the wandering portion of their label suggests, have moved around without developing patterns of sustained change across time. We say of them, then, that, so far as we can tell from the autoregressive estimations, their movements are as-if random. Of course, the "homeostatic" qualifier in the label indicates that a party's wandering is anchored in a meaningful position, presumably to their leaders as well to voters.
It is proper to ask whether the wandering is untethered or homeostatic. A set of completely random numbers will have a mean; hence having a mean can hardly be a justification for inferring that it is necessary to try to capture the dynamic aspects of party positioning.
A word of caution is in order. Almost surely all the remaining dynamic variation beyond that which we have labeled systematic should not be thrown on the junk pile, to be labeled noise.
Statistical models of cross-temporal attributions of stability, change, and noise require one to have in mind a model of 'true behavioral change' in order to be able to separate noise in the measurements from change in the behavior (Heise 1969) . Typically, the implicit model of "true" behavior change is a Markovian process. This is the model implicit in the interpretations we put to our autoregressive equations. In effect, the assumption says that when behavior truly changes it does so systematically (i.e., in predictable ways). It then adds by implication that to the extent behavior is not predictable the remaining portion of the measured signal is noise. A close examination of systematic change by party that we report would reveal at least a few widely accepted real changes that do not show themselves as such in our results. One clear example is Britain's Labour Party. Surely it has moved from left to right under the leadership of Tony Blair and the CMP records that movement. But, because it showed up so late in the CMP series, it effectively is left as noise, because by 1998 it was still too early to say whether the movement was systematic.
Cross-National Variation
We accept that an important purpose of left-right party position indicators is what Castles and Mair have said it is, to provide valid indications of party differences within and across nations. We also accept that party family affiliations are not up to the task of drawing consistent distinctions between parties across nations, even though family affiliations are surely useful for rank orderings within nations (see, for example, the within-nation rank orders from different studies in Mair 2001, 21-22) .
Under the assumption that family affiliation does not travel especially well across nations, we expect that some part of the variation within families comes from national influences on individual parties. Norway's political space, for example, while containing variance that is largely associated with parties from different families, makes its own contribution to the location of Norwegian parties.
For that reason, we expect Norway's political parties to be generally to the left of parties that share a nominal family affiliation in, say, Australia and the United States. This is because Norway's labor party (DNA), an affiliate of the social democratic family, is to the left of the social democratic family affiliates of Australian Labour and American Democrats. As well, we expect the Norwegian Høyre (conservative family) to be to the left of Australian Liberals and American Republicans (also conservative family affiliates).
Our analyses focus on 79 parties belonging to one of eight families in 17 nations, the same nations used in the factor analysis above (see fn. 1). We include parties from eight families:
communists, greens, social democrats, liberals, Christians, agrarians, conservatives, and nationalists. 
Cross-Family Variation
We begin by investigating how the four sets of left-right scores line-up by party family. The family averages are shown in Table 3 . As one would expect, on average, communists are far left; greens and social democrats are on the left; liberals, agrarians, and Christians are center to center-right;
conservatives are on the right; and nationalists are far right. On this general ordering, all four data sets agree.
[ Table 3 about here]
A more detailed consideration table, however, with attention focused on variability across and within families, shows the CMP data stand distinct from the three sets of expert survey data. Perhaps most noteworthy is more cross-family and less within-family variation in the expert survey sets compared to the CMP. The experts record more homogeneity within families and more distinctiveness between and among families compared to the record from the CMP. A statistical representation of this is apparent from the R 2 values at the bottom of the table. Sizable proportions of the left-right variation for the expert data are associated with family affiliation; all three exceed .8.
Given that error variance (simple noise) almost surely constitutes between 5 and 10 percent of the total variance of each set of expert scores, these R 2 values are probably too high for confidence that the expert survey results are capturing important within-family, cross-national differences. At a minimum this is contrary to the stated purpose of moving beyond family to more finely graded leftright scores. Therefore, at first reading, the expert survey data do not appear to tell us much about left-right party positions beyond what party family affiliations, standing alone, could have told us.
That the CMP data are not so strongly associated with party family, having an R 2 of .553, is therefore potentially good news. Is it? The answer depends on whether the CMP variation not associated with party family is attributable in part to variation from cross-national differences.
Cross-National Variation
One way to estimate where in left-right space each nation's party system operates relative to the space of other nations' party systems is to calculate the distance between each party's left-right position and its family mean and then average those distances by nation.
6
For nations whose parties stand uniformly to the left of their respective family means, the average distance will be negative; for nations whose parties stand uniformly to the right of their respective family means, the average distance will be positive. Table 4 reports the national averages. For the CMP data, a statistically significant 38 percent of the variation in these party differences is associated with the nations. Among the expert survey sets of scores, the constructed left-right score for Laver-Hunt has the highest percent of variance associated with nations, 32 percent, but with such a large number of dummy variables it falls just short of statistical significance (F = 1.780, p = .055). For the Castles-Mair as well as the Huber-Inglehart scores, the variance associated with the nation dummy variables is clearly not greater than chance.
[ Table 4 about here]
The findings in Table 3 combined with those in Table 4 suggest that party locations identified by expert surveys, especially Castles-Mair and Huber-Inglehart, correspond so closely to party family affiliation that information about nations does not tell us very much about party positions. This conclusion should not be overdrawn however; it is conditional upon a statistical analysis that considers all nations jointly. When attention is switched to specific nations, one can see common tendencies that have to be taken to mean that not all the expert cross-national differences are just noise. All four data sets, for example, have parties in Canada placed to the left of their family counterparts. Also, the CMP and expert surveys commonly place parties in Australia to the right of their respective families, on average. Given such commonalities, it has to be said that there is some degree of cross-national validity, or at least reliability, in all four studies.
The question is whether the selected common tendencies are generalizable. We can look at the generalizability by correlating the four sets of national positions reported in Table 4 Close inspection of the country-specific numbers in Table 2 Under the restricted set of 12 countries all the correlations are statistically significant.
Considering the evidence overall, we conclude there are problems with the cross-national comparability of party spaces but that several of the problems are identifiable and, in part, surmountable. The cross-national variation in party locations identified in expert surveys appears strongly conditioned by party family affiliation, and as a consequence the cross-national variation is muted.
Discussion and Conclusion
Two aspects of our results are especially important. First, party left-right positions change and drift in systematic ways, movements the CMP measurements allow one to observe but expert surveys do not.
That makes the CMP generally preferred to expert surveys for analyses involving left-right party positions over an appreciable amount of time. Second, cross-national variation in expert survey leftright party positions is muted; they contain little more than the variation associated with party reputations as ascertained from party-family affiliation. The CMP measurements contain variation attributable to national differences. Parties in Canada and Norway, for example, are relative more left-leaning within each party family compared to parties in the same family in the U.S. and Australia.
Thus, on the cross-national comparability, too, the CMP data are generally preferred to expert survey data.
What one makes of these findings and what one does about the CMP data being generally preferred depends on the theoretical concern and empirical conditions of a particular investigation.
The analyses presented here are not to be seen as a competition from which a winner is declared. It is not so much that one data set is good and the other bad, or one is good but the other better. Until a theoretical concern is specified, such claims are standard-less. Rather, one approach to measuring party positions is more and another less consistent with a particular theoretically anchored investigation.
Some theoretical interests reside with the ideological standing of parties with respect to their longstanding core principles. In those cases, expert survey data can be expected to perform well. It is the longstanding core principles, we surmise, that give rise to expert surveys persistently positioning a party in a similar left-right location across time. If experts, on average, across the several experts from each country, are recording the longstanding core principle positions of parties, then investigations of whether a party's ideological position predicts particular policy stands among its adherents-say, for a member of the European Parliament who sits among one of the transnational parliamentary party groupings somewhat detached from the daily twists and turns of domestic political debates or for a member of the mass public who is likely to have a general, not specific, idea of his or her preferred party's position taking-it would be wise to use party locations measured as longstanding core principle as the indicator of a national party's ideological position. For theoretical concerns that involve party and partisan activity closer to home, and in the sometimes strategic maneuvering of electoral politics, taking account of the shorter run dynamics will usually have importance.
As for the muted cross-national variation in expert surveys, its consideration may well highlight the essential nature of the problem faced when measuring left-right positions through this method.
The concept of left-right has no secure anchor. Experts are left to determine their own individual frame of reference. Each expert respondent may set his or her reference in accordance with, say, what it means to be centrist in the expert's own nation. But, because being centrist in Norway is more leftleaning than being centrist in the United States, the between-nation distinction is lost to the nationspecific anchors of national experts. That the Castles-Mair and Huber-Inglehart results have more muted cross-national variation than the Laver-Hunt left-right score might be quite revealing in that regard. That is, the Laver-Hunt distinctiveness may be a consequence of having constructed our Laver-Hunt left-right score from a set of anchored policy positions in each of three policy domains, in contrast to asking experts to locate parties along an unanchored left-right line. 7 We are not suggesting a simple-minded reasoning process for experts when assigning left-right positions, of the sort where an expert is supposed to think, 'well, this is a party in the social democratic family, so I will given it a left-right score of 3.7.' Rather, we suspect, experts must use some sort of anchor to give meaning to the left-right score they assign. A useful candidate for the anchor, we suppose, is the political center of the national party system. While that works well enough for rank orderings within nations (Mair 2001) , it leaves unanchored a center position that would make measurements across nations comparable.
What can be done? Where either cross-temporal or cross-national comparability is important, interest focuses on left-right, and party positions over the past half-century are critical, the CMP data are preferred to the expert survey data. 8 On questions related to party positions in specific policy domains-taxes versus spending, privatization, the environment, the European Union, decentralized institutional arrangements, among others-expert surveys have anchors; so, at least for cross-national and very likely for cross-temporal comparisons, survey results may serve quite nicely. And, looking ahead, expert surveys might be able to create anchors by identifying for respondents a common reference-e.g., by saying to the expert respondents something like, 'assuming the American Democrats are at 4.0 on a ten-point left-right scale, where are the parties in your nation located?' Started center, moved left, then steadily back to center and continued on past center to right 50s = +4.5 60s = -26.8 70s = -13.8 80s = +4.6 90s = +39.5
Ireland FG 53520 11.1 6.5
Started right, moved steadily to center-left until 80s, then moved to center-right 50s = +46.6 60s = -2.0 70s = -17.6 80s = +2. Started erratically around center, more reliably center in late 60s and 70s, and moved right in 80s and 90s 50s = +7.0 60s = +4.3 70s = +3.7 80s = +28.5 90s = +27.3
Source: Estimations and compilations by authors based on CMP data a A drifting party takes left-right positions in a manner that change predictably from one election to the next but has an estimated long-run left-right position close to its mean left-right position over the post-war period (within +4 points). Table entries are for party families mean left-right locations based on zero-to-ten metrics for all four data sets. Summary statistics come from regressing the party positions onto dummy variables for each of seven families, withholding one family to serve as the baseline category. .22 (1.19) .23 (.81) .20 (.59) New Zealand 2 -.53 (.25) -.46 (1.02) .67 (1.31) .82
(1.09) Austria 3 1.05 (.58) -.03 (.86) .51 (.72) .82
(1.50) Australia 4 1.33 (1.08) .83 (1.08) .42 (.56) .18
(1.43) Denmark 7 .91 (1.88) .35 (.98) .68 (1.01) .41
( a One large leftward changer (-34, Dutch ARP) is not fully depicted in this representation; it is one of the three cases in the category labeled < -12
1 The nations are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. Data for this analysis and those reported below are available at the Binghamton University website found at the following address-http://www.binghamton.edu/polsci/research/mcdonalddata.htm.
2 These are not the exact same 17 nations used in the factor analysis. Here we exclude Spain, because the number of elections since democratization is too small and we include Luxembourg, which was not present in the factor analysis because its parties had not been scored by Castles and Mair. 3 A few data points in CMP are estimated, based on a party's manifesto at an earlier election. Such carryover data present problems for our analyses on two counts. They artificially reduce variations and create autocorrelation. Therefore, we exclude carryover manifestos. The exclusion is usually for one election at the beginning or end of a party's series. The single election exclusions are the Belgian PVV in 1995, the Belgian FDF in 1965 , the Belgian VU in 1958 , the Canadian SC in 1972 and 1974 , all Danish parties in 1998 , all Norwegian parties in 1997 , and the Swiss SVP in 1947 . Dropping the 1998 Danish data caused observations on the Danish CD and KF to go from 11 of 22 (half) to 10 of 21 (less than half). Still, we decided to keep both Danish parties in the analyses. In the case of the French Conservatives, the entire series had to be excluded because several of its manifestos are recorded as estimates. Also, the single manifesto score of the United Socialists in Italy for the 1968 election is the 1968 score that we assign individually and separately to the PSI and PSDI. 4 As we explain immediately below, the dynamic mean we are referring to is distinguishable from the commonly referred to mean. For estimation of a dynamic mean one first estimates a bivariate autoregressive equation to determine whether the slope is zero. If the slope is zero, then the mean value of Y at any given time is estimated to be equal to the autoregressive intercept. If the slope is different from zero, then the mean, which is estimated to vary, is calculated by dividing the intercept by one minus the slope. For informative discussions about autoregressive equations, with substantive applications to politics, see Spafford (1971) and Price and Sanders (1993) . 5 We take what could be considered a liberal approach to a decision rule for reliably estimated relationships, but what we have done in fact is to take account of the effect of measurement error. Errors in an X variable reduce the magnitude of an estimated slope, and errors in both the X and Y variables are likely to increase the slope's standard error. Given that a t-ratio is (b / s b ), the effect of measurement errors makes tests of statistical significance at conventional levels (e.g., p < .05) prone to Type II errors. Therefore, we loosen the conventional standard of, say, p < .05 so that reliably predicted behavior is deemed to exist when a slope's t-value has a magnitude such that t < -1.5 or t > 1.5. Twenty-one parties show a statistically significant relationship at conventional levels, compared to 27 using our looser 1.5 t-value. Note that the liberal decision rule has no effect on our subsequent analyses and evaluations, except to cause us to provide detailed descriptions of change for 27 (8 changers and 19 drifters) in tables 1 and 2, instead of 21 parties.
Tests of statistical significance could also be affected by autocorrelated errors. We have checked for autocorrelation for each of the 81 party series. When a lagged value of Y is on the right hand side, the test (e.g., Durbin's h) is a large sample test and is not especially powerful. With our small samples, between 6
and 21 elections for any one party, about half of the tests are not calculable. However, we can and have calculated values of rho for all parties. We find an estimated rho between + .25 for 72 of the 81 parties.
Therefore, in no more than few cases could it be said that a concern about autocorrelation is warranted.
6 Analyzing difference-score variables can create inferential complications. They assume that the coefficient on X, in a (Y -X) calculation, is 1.0. If it is not, then analyzing the reasons for the differences reflects in part the reasons for the differences themselves and in part the reasons why the coefficient is not 1.0. We have checked to ensure that such complications do not confound our analyses of cross-national differences.
In addition to asking how the difference scores relate to nation dummy variables, we created a variable from the party family means and moved it to the right-hand side of the equation. Thereafter we regressed the respective party scores onto the mean party family values (i.e., Y-hat from the party family regression) plus
